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I.
During World War 11, thousands of GIs in the uniform of the United
States armed forces were naturalized abroad under the Second War Pow-
ers Act.1 Many prominent United States citizens were not born within the
jurisdiction of the United States. George Romney was born in Mexico.
Senator Barry Goldwater was born in the territory of Arizona before it
became a state. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. was born in Canada.2 All of
these loyal Americans will be shocked and amazed to learn that since April
5, 1971, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of
Rogers v. Bellei, (No. 24, Oct. Term, 1970), they possess a citizenship of
inferior quality.
In the words of the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, they were
not born in the United States, they were not naturalized in the United
States and they are simply not Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence cit-
izens. Their failure to possess constitutional citizenship, it would appear,
permits Congress to prescribe forfeiture of citizenship upon the basis of
foreign residence. This authority is denied to Congress in the cases of
those born or naturalized in the United States and subject to our jurisdic-
tion. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 US 163 (1964). To understand the latest
pronouncement of the Supreme Court, analysis is required of our citizen-
ship and expatriation laws and their background.
II.
Our expatriation laws had a simple beginning. While a law for the
acquisition of United States citizenship by naturalization was enacted as
early as 1790, it was not until nearly a century later, in 1868, that the first
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expatriation statute was enacted. Prior to its enactment, it was contended
that in conformity with the English common law, citizenship was immu-
table.3 On July 27, 1868, Congress enacted a joint resolution declaring that
expatriation was "a natural and inherent right of all people, ' 4 an assertion
which "seems a logical concomitant of the extensive practice of natural-
ization in this country."
5
Until the passage of the 1907 Expatriation Act, Congress did not pro-
vide any legislative guide for administrative action in declaring citizenship
forfeit. Pursuant to a 1906 joint resolution, three State Department officials
had submitted a report to Congress 6 which resulted in the enactment of the
1907 Act.7 This Act provided that no person should be allowed to ex-
patriate himself when the United States was at war, and prescribed ex-
patriation when a citizen (1) was naturalized in a foreign state in con-
formity with its laws; (2) took an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; and
(3) married a male foreigner and took his nationality. Naturalized Ameri-
cans residing abroad for two years in their country of origin or five years
elsewhere did not lose citizenship, but were deprived of diplomatic protec-
tion.
The Nationality Act of 1940, based on recommendations of the Secre-
tary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor 8 became
effective on January 13, 1941. 9 The grounds of expatriation were increased
to ten. Foreign military or civil service, voting in foreign elections, renun-
ciation before a United States consul abroad and in limited cases in the
United States, treason, draft dodging, and in the case of naturalized cit-
izens foreign residence, were added as grounds of expatriation.
The provision for the expatriation of naturalized citizens who reside in
the country of their birth or former nationality was proposed because of the
large number of naturalized citizens residing abroad. It was urged that by
the expatriation of these "nominal" citizens who resided abroad for
insufficient reasons, the difficulty and embarrassment to the United States
39 Op. ATTY GEN. 356 (1859): Tsiang, The Question of Expatriation in the United
States Prior to 1907(1942) p. 45.
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in its efforts to extend protection to other naturalized citizens in mer-
itorious cases, would be lessened.
On the other hand, it was recognized that this provision for the loss of
citizenship although fully warranted, "may appear to be somewhat dras-
tic." 10 The expatriation provision for naturalized citizens residing abroad
for five years in any foreign country was added as a result of the testimony
of a State Department official who believed that there were too many
naturalized Russian and German Zionists going to Palestine." It was
concluded that "as proceedings in the courts would be cumbersome,
long-drawn-out and expensive to the government, the termination of na-
tionality should be automatic, resulting directly from the fact of foreign
residence."12
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 continued the expatriating
provisions of the 1940 Act with some changes.' 3 It added a provision
authorizing expatriation of persons who acquired dual nationality at birth
and "voluntarily sought or claimed benefits" of their foreign nationality and
resided in the foreign state for three continuous years after the age of 22.14
The Act also creates a conclusive presumption that an expatriating act is
performed voluntarily if, at the time of the act, a person was a national of
the state in which the act was performed and had been in the state for a
period aggregating ten years or more immediately prior to such act.' 5 This
provision is of questionable constitutionality. 16 A 1954 amendment added
conviction for rebellion, insurrection, seditious conspiracy and advocating
the unlawful overthrow of the Government as further grounds of ex-
patriation. 17
From the days when people believed in the English doctrine of immu-
table allegiance, to the time when we merely declared that a person had a
right to cast off his citizenship, we proceeded to a point at which our
statutory laws provided more grounds than any other country in the world
for loss of citizenship. 18 By a series of Supreme Court decisions, the
expatriation laws of the United States were seriously restricted.' 9
"'Hearings on H.R. 6172, op. cit. 495; Senate Misc. Report 2150, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
p. 4.
"Hearing on H.R. 6127, op. cit. 140- 141.
.121d., at 495.
"38 USC 1481 etseq.
141d., 1482.
151d., 148 1(b).
"'Manley v. Georgia, 279 US 1 (1928); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 US 239 (1925);
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 US 312 (1931).
178 USC 1481(a)(9) as amended by 68 Stat. 1146.
"'See: Laws Concerning Nationality, United Nations Legislative Series (1954).
"'See: Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for
a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VIRGINIA L. REV. 408 (1970).
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In Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958) expatriation on the basis of a
desertion conviction was found to be cruel and unusual punishment in
contravention of the Eighth Amendment. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 US 144 (1963), declared unconstitutional provisions for expatriation
based on departure from the United States to evade military service. It was
held that punishment was thereby inflicted without the procedural
safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 US
163 (1964) invalidated the expatriation section providing for loss of citizen-
ship by a naturalized American who resided for three years in the country
of his birth or former nationality. The Court said:
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized
citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country
than do the native born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to
make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process.' * * * A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad in-
definitely without suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at
naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad in a
way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship.
Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native-born, is no badge
of lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of
nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be compelled by family, business, or
other legitimate reasons. 20
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 US 253 (1967) involved a naturalized citizen who
voted in an Israeli legislative election. Expatriation on this basis was
declared unconstitutional, and the prior holding to the contrary in Perez v.
Brownell, 356 US 44 (1958) was overruled. The Court delcared:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does,
protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruc-
tion of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no
more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship. 21
The cases culminating with Afroyim, restored expatriation to a voluntary
basis. It has been said that "the practical effect of Afroyim will be to reduce
the number of final determinations of expatriation, to increase the number
of citizens with dual nationality, and to facilitate the involvement of US
citizens in the community life and processes of foreign states without
jeopardizing their citizenship. ' 22
20377 US at 168- 169.
21387 US at 268.
22Duval1, op. cit. supra, note 19 at 451.
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III.
Until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (14 Stat. 27) and adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were no provisions in our written
laws defining the citizenship status of those born in the United States.
These provisions, incorporating the doctrine of jus soli, were said to be
declaratory of the common law, inherited from England. 23 The Fourteenth
Amendment also provided that persons naturalized in the United States
and subject to its jurisdiction were to be recognized as citizens.
The principle of jus sanguinis, citizenship derived through the nation-
ality of parents, likewise had English antecedents. Since 1708, foreign-born
children of natural-born British subjects were considered natural born
subjects of the kingdom "to all intents, constructions and purposes what-
soever.'"24 The statutory law of England, and leading British authorities,
considered a person born abroad who acquired citizenship at birth, to be a
natural-born subject.25
In 1790, the First Congress enacted legislation providing that "the
children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond the sea,
or out of the limits of the United States shall be considered as natural-
born." 1 Stat. 103. There were subsequent enactments in 179526 and in
1802.27 In 1855, Revised Statutes §1993 was enacted declaring persons
born abroad to citizen fathers to be citizens of the United States, provided
the father had resided in the United States. 28 The Act of March 2, 1907
required citizens born on foreign soil to register an intention to reside in the
United States on reaching the age of 18, and to take an oath of allegiance
upon reaching majority, in order to receive protection while they resided
abroad.29
On May 24, 1934, section 1993 of the Revised Statutes was amended to
grant citizenship to children born abroad of citizen parents regardless of
the sex of such parents, provided one citizen parent had resided in the
United States prior to the birth of the child. If one of the parents was an
alien and the other a citizen, the right of citizenship was declared not to
descend unless the child resided for five years in the United States after his
18th birthday and unless he took an oath of allegiance.30 This was followed
"aUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 US 649, 688 (1898); Van Dyne, Citizenship of
the United States, pp. 1, 7 (1903).
247 Anne, c.5 § 3 (1708). For the modem English rule, see LAWS CONCERNING NATION-
ALITY, OP. cit., supra, note 18 at 470.
2Gordon, op. cit., supra, note 2 at p. 7.
261 Stat. 415.
272 Stat. 155.
2 8See Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 US 657 ( ); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 US 308 ( ).
2934 Stat. 1229.
3048 Stat. 797.
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by the Nationality Act of 1940 which required the parent to have ten
years' residence in the United States, at least five of which were after
attaining the age of 16.
In order to retain citizenship, the child was required to reside in the
United States for five years between the ages of 13 and 21. The retention
requirement was made inapplicable where a parent at the time of the child's
birth was residing abroad in the Government service, in the service of an
official international agency in which the United States participated, or in
the employment of an American educational, scientific, philanthropic, reli-
gious, commercial or financial organization having its principal place of
business in the United States, and for which the parent received substantial
compensation. These provisions regarding retention of citizenship were
made applicable to a child born abroad after May 24, 1934.31
Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as amended
(8 USC 1401) requires that prior to the child's birth, the parent have been
physically present in the United States for periods of not less than ten
years, at least five of which were after attaining 14 years of age. Retention
of citizenship acquired at birth is dependent on the child's return to the
United States, and five years physical presence in the United States be-
tween the ages of 14 and 28. Omitted from the 1952 Act, now in force, is
any dispensation for children of parents pursuing activities beneficial to our
foreign policy or to the best interests of the United States.
IV.
Aldo Mario Bellei's parents were married in the United States in 1939.
His mother was born in the United States, and had the requisite residence
here. His father was an Italian citizen. Shortly after the marriage, the
parents left for Italy where Aldo was born on December 22, 1939. Bellei
became a citizen of both the United States and Italy at birth. In due
course, he registered for United States military service under the Selective
Service Act. He came to the United States on short trips in 1948, 1951,
1955 and 1962, traveling on American passports. When he failed to take up
United States residence at age 23, he was advised by the State Depart-
ment, that he had lost his American citizenship.
Bellei then brought suit to declare the citizenship retention provisions of
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act unconstitutional, and therefore
that he had not lost his citizenship. A three-judge district court, relying
upon Schneider v. Rusk and Afroyim v. Rusk, declared the statute invalid.
Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F.Supp. 1247 (Dist. of Col. 1969). A direct appeal was
3154 Stat. 1139; section 201 (g) of the Nationality Act of 1940.
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taken to the Supreme Court, before which the case was argued initially in
January, 1970, and then re-argued on November 12, 1970.
On April 5, 1971, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court reversed, upholding
the constitutionality of the statute and the loss of Bellei's citizenship. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, distinguishes the Schneider
and Afroyim cases, involving naturalized citizens, on the ground that nat-
uralized citizenship is recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment. The opin-
ion states:
The central fact in our weighing of the plaintiffs claim to continuing and
therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born abroad. He
was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United
States. And he had not been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bellei. He simply is not
a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen.
Treating the case as a problem in dual nationality, the court held further:
The solution to the dual nationality dilemma provided by the Congress by
way of required residence surely is not unreasonable. It may not be the best
that could be devised, but here, too, we cannot say that it is irrational or
arbitrary or unfair.
Moreover, the court believed that conditions precedent and subsequent
should be considered indistinguishable. It said:
We feel that it does not make good constitutional sense, or comport with
logic, to say, on the one hand, that Congress may impose a condition prece-
dent, with no constitutional complication, and yet be powerless to impose
precisely the same condition subsequent. Any such distinction, of course,
must rest, if it has any basis at all, on the asserted 'premise that the rights of
citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same
dignity and are coextensive' Schneider v. Rusk, supra, 377 U.S. at 165, and
on the announcement that Congress has no "power, express or implied, to
take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent," Afroyim v.
Rusk, supra, 387 U.S. at 257. But as pointed out above, these were utter-
ances bottomed upon Fourteenth Amendment citizenship and that Amend-
ment's direct reference to "persons born or naturalized in the United States."
The majority opinion provoked two vigorous dissents. Justice Black,
joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, stated:
The holding (in Afroyim v. Rusk) was clear. Congress could not until today,
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an Ameri-
can of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up.
Now this Court, by a vote of five to four through a simple change in its
composition, overrules that decision. * * * * * * the Court held in Afroyim
that no American can be deprived of his citizenship without his assent.
Today, the Court overrules that holding. This precious Fourteenth Amend-
ment American citizenship should not be blown around by every passing
political wind that changes the composition of this Court.
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I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others.
Bellei was not 'born in the United States,' but he was constitutionally
speaking, 'naturalized in the United States.' Although those Americans who
acquire their citizenship under statutes conferring citizenship on the for-
eign-born children of citizens, are not popularly thought of as naturalized
citizens, the use of the word 'naturalize' in this way has a considerable
constitutional history. * * * Rather than the technical reading adopted by the
majority, it is my view that the word 'in' as it appears in the phrase 'in the
United States' (in the Fourteenth Amendment) was surely meant to be
understood in two somewhat different senses: one can become a citizen of
this country by being born within it or being naturalized into it.
I would not depart from the holding in Afroyim that every American citizen
has Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. Bellei, as a naturalized American, is
entitled to all the rights and privileges of American citizenship, including the
right to keep his citizenship until he voluntarily renounces or relinquishes it."
Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Douglas concurred, k equally
caustic. It states:
Since the Court this Term has already downgraded citizens receiving
public welfare, Wyman v. James, 400 U. S.-(197 1), and citizens having the
misfortune to be illegitimate, Labine v. Vincent,-U. S.-(1971), I suppose
today's decision downgrading citizens born outside the United States should
have been expected. Once again, as in James and Labine, the Court's opinion
makes evident that its holding is contrary to earlier decisions. Concededly
petitioner was a citizen at birth not by constitutional right, but only through
operation of a federal statute. In the light of the complete lack of rational
basis for distinguishing among citizens whose naturalization was carried out
within the physical bounds of the United States, and those, like Bellei, who
may be naturalized overseas, the conclusion is compelled that the reference in
the Fourteenth Amendment to persons "born or naturalized in the United
States" includes those naturalized through operation of an Act of Congress,
wherever they may be at the time. Congress was therefore powerless to strip
Bellei of his citizenship; he could lose it only if he voluntarily renounced or
relinquished it.Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
Conclusion
It is clear, as the dissenting members of the Supreme Court note, that
the Court which decided Schneider and Afroyim, would have sustained the
citizenship of Bellei. Although the majority attempted to deny it, the Bellei
decision does create a second class citizenship for those born abroad.
Treating this as a case involving a dual national, leaves many unanswered
questions. Bellei registered for the draft and on four occasions travelled on
American passports. Was not this sufficient manifestation of his desire to
elect American citizenship? Why should five years' residence in the United
States between the ages of 14 and 28, be the only way to elect? Would it
really have made a better or more complete citizen of Bellei? Will the
Court reach a contrary conclusion when a case arises involving someone
who is not a dual national?
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The case represents retrogression in the doctrine that expatriation can
only result from voluntary action by a citizen. It espouses the outmoded
notion, rejected by Schneider, that foreign residence by a citizen demon-
strates disloyalty. As the amicus brief of the American Wives of Europe-
ans and the American Bar observed:
Whatever validity the residence requirement may have had as a test of
allegiance and identification for foreign-born children of one citizen-parent
when it was originally inserted, it has no validity today. The circumstances of
1970 are not those of 1934. The revolution in transportation and commu-
nication has rendered obsolete whatever validity may have once attached to
residence as a test of allegiance. In a world of jet aircraft, of television via
satellite, of unprecedented economic, political and cultural interdependence,
with large numbers of persons serving their governments and private in-
stitutions overseas, the fact of residence in one country does not necessarily
imply allegiance to that country or preclude allegiance to the country of
which they are citizens.
It is to be hoped that at some future date, the principles of voluntary
expatriation will again protect statutory citizens, and that loss of citizen-
ship will then again be responsive to present-day world conditions.
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